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ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION: A RESTATEMENT OF
THE TEST FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Aaron M. Broaddus"
I. INTRODUCTION
The current approaches used by the courts in analyzing and deciding claims of
copyright infringement vary among the different circuits and within each circuit
based on the type of work at issue. Despite the myriad of approaches adopted by
the various courts and those advocated by numerous commentators, no clear,
workable set of rules has emerged to deal with this issue.
Additional complications arise from the use of confusing and inconsistent
terminology in the courts' opinions. But despite the problems that pervade this
area of the law, the Supreme Court has yet to address this issue in a way that
provides meaningful guidance to the lower courts.'
This paper aims to provide a framework that can be applied to resolve copy-
right infringement issues regardless of the type of work in question.' The pro-
posed methodology is based on the "filtration" approach that is emerging as the
preferred method for analyzing infringement cases involving computer pro-
grams.' The basic principle underlying this methodology is the "filtering" out of
* Aaron M. Broaddus is a 1994 graduate of DePaul University College of Law. An earlier
version of this Article won second place in the 1993 ASCAP/Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
at DePaul University College of Law and was entered in the national competition.
The author wishes to thank Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall of DePaul University College of
Law and fellow student Megan Shea for their constructive comments and suggestions on the author's
original draft of this Article.
1. The Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991), while dealing with a claim of copyright infringement, disposed of the issue upon finding that
the material copied by the defendant was not protected expression. The Court found that the material
copied by the defendant lacked the necessary level of creativity to warrant copyright protection. Thus,
despite the defendant's having copied substantial portions of plaintiff's copyrighted telephone directo-
ry, there was no copyright infringement as the copied material was not protected material. For this
reason the Court in Feist found it unnecessary to undertake an extended analysis of the infringement
issue.
2. Of course, there will be some variation in the actual analysis of different types of works. For
example, an analysis of the specific elements of a literary work is not likely to be much help in rela-
tion to musical works. The purpose of the proposed test is to provide a clear methodology that allows
for application to various types of works in such a manner as to provide for ease in application, clari-
ty in approach, and predictability in outcome.
3. For a detailed explanation of this methodology as applied to computer programs See David
Nimmer, et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software
in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 625 (1988). See also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAvID NiMMER, NMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[F] (1992) (hereinafter "NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT").
Nimmer has also suggested in his treatise that the Supreme Court's decision in Feist supports the
1
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any unprotected elements of the plaintiff's work before comparing that work with
the defendant's allegedly infringing work. The proposed analysis starts with an
inquiry as to the validity of the plaintiff's copyright ownership and a consider-
ation of the defendant's access to the plaintiff's work. After ownership and ac-
cess are established, the inquiry turns to a separation of unprotectible ideas from
the protectible expression contained in the plaintiff's work. Once the protectible
expression is separated, any additional unprotected elements are "filtered" out,
leaving a core of protectible expression. Finally, after the filtration step, the
question to be addressed is whether the defendant appropriated plaintiff's protect-
ed expression, and whether such appropriation is sufficient to warrant a finding
of copyright infringement.
On the issue of improper appropriation, the proposed methodology breaks
with the traditional approach by comparing only the plaintiff's protected expres-
sion, not the plaintiff's work as a whole, to that of the defendant's. It is also
argued that analytic dissection and expert testimony, both of which are almost
exclusively precluded in the determination of whether there has been improper
appropriation, are permissible, and should be viewed as necessary where the
works at issue involve matters beyond the fact finder's scope of knowledge.4
Part Two of this paper provides a critical overview of the current copyright
infringement approaches of the various circuits, including a discussion of the
shortcomings and contradictions that exist in applying these approaches. Part
Three restates the filtration approach and applies the new formulation to various
copyright infringement cases involving different types of works.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
As stated by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., Inc.,5 "[t]o establish [copyright] infringement, two elements must be prov-
en: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements
application of this methodology to works other than computer programs. Nimmer correctly notes the
Court's analysis in Feist as having taken "a copyrighted work and eliminated from the substantial
similarity calculus all material therein not subject to copyright" prior to comparing the work to the
defendant's on the question of improper appropriation. Id. at § 13.03[E][1][b]. This methodology
mirrors the filtration approach. Thus, as Feist was not limited to cases involving directories or com-
pilations, it would seem to be consistent with Feist to undertake a similar analysis regardless of the
type of work being considered.
A thorough analysis of the filtration approach, as interpreted by the Second Circuit, is set forth
in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). This case is discussed in
detail infra, sections Il(B)(3)(a) and IIe(B)(4).
4. The rare instances where analytic dissection and expert testimony have been permitted on the
question of improper appropriation have been limited primarily to cases dealing with computer pro-
grams. But even in those cases, the decisions allowing analytic dissection and expert testimony on
this question are relatively few in number. But the trend does seem to be moving in that direction.
See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d 693.
5. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
[Vol. V:43
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol5/iss1/3
TEST FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
of the work that are original." Thus, in the broadest of terms, infringement
analysis may be construed as consisting of two elements, ownership and copying.
Although the following discussion is organized accordingly, the primary focus is
on the second part of the copyright infringement analysis which is by far the
most problematic.
A. OWNERSHIP
Copyright ownership 7 is a prerequisite to a finding of copyright infringement.
Under the 1976 Copyright Act,8 a copyright registration certificate constitutes
prima facie evidence of ownership.9 Once the plaintiff makes such a prima facie
showing of ownership, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a lack of
ownership." Because of the ease in establishing ownership as an initial matter,
and the difficulty in rebutting the presumption of ownership, the vast majority of
plaintiffs in infringement cases have little trouble on this issue. Once ownership
is established, the court must then turn to the more difficult issue of copying.
B. COPYING
Actual proof, as substantiated by direct evidence such as admission or eyewit-
ness testimony, is the most desirable means of establishing copying of a
plaintiff's work. If copying can be shown by direct proof, then the court need
only consider whether such copying amounts to improper appropriation." Be-
cause such proof is often lacking, the courts allow plaintiffs an alternative means
to prove copying, by use of circumstantial evidence. Proving copying by circum-
stantial evidence is often stated as requiring the plaintiff to show "(1) that the
defendant had access to the plaintiff's work, and (2) that the two works are
6. Id. at 361 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).
7. It is important to note that the six rights listed in § 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-801 (1989), are separate, distinct and severable. For example, one may own the right to make
reproductions of the original (§ 106(1)) while another individual may own the right to produce deriv-
ative works based on the original (§ 106(2)).
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1989).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1989), provides that
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validi-
ty of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be
accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of
the court.
10. See Gund, Inc. v. Applause, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that a copy-
right registration certificate is prima facie evidence of copyright ownership, "shifting to [the defen-
dant] the burden of proving the contrary.")
11. If direct proof of copying is shown, it is still necessary to entertain the question of improper
appropriation. The mere existence of copied material does not render a defendant's work infringing.
Such copying might be de minimis, that is, insignificant in quantity or quality, it might consist of
material in the public domain, or it may be unprotected expression. Thus, even if copying is shown
by direct proof, it must still be shown that the copying extends to the plaintiff's protected expression
and that the copying is sufficient to warrant a finding of infringement. See infra, section II(B)(3).
1995]
3
Broaddus: Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyrigh
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
46 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW [Vol. V:43
substantially similar."'2 On the question of substantial similarity it is recognized
that "a plaintiff establishes substantial similarity by showing (1) that 'the defen-
dant copied from the plaintiff's work and (2) [that] the copying, if proven, went
so far as to constitute improper appropriation."'3
This widely accepted formulation of the copyright infringement test, requiring
a showing of substantial similarity to prove copying, and requiring proof of
copying to show substantial similarity, is but an introduction to the confusion
which pervades this area of the law. As this formulation of the infringement test
demonstrates, much of this confusion is due to the use of improper and inconsis-
tent terminology.'4 The modified infringement test set out in Part H of this pa-
per is an attempt to eliminate this confusion.
As for the double use of "copying" in the above discussion, the fact is that
"copying" is not being used in the same sense in both instances. Copying as used
in the first instance, in referring to the elements of the copyright claim, "refers to
the ultimate... issue of whether the defendant violated the copyright laws by
reproducing protectible [sic] expression from the plaintiff's work."' 5 In the sec-
ond instance, where "copying" is used as a part of the substantial similarity test,
it refers to the "purely factual issue of whether the defendant used the plaintiff's
work as a starting point for his own."' 6
In an effort to avoid such confusing formulations, the following discussion
sets out the requirements for proving copying by circumstantial evidence as
calling for a three part inquiry. This formulation follows the Second Circuits's
decision in Arnstein v. Porter,7 the leading case on copyright infringement. Our
analysis begins with a discussion of access and the issues related to proof of ac-
cess. Then we consider the question of copying, that is, copying as used in the
"substantial similarity" context discussed above. And finally, we look to the
issues related to improper appropriation."
12. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Atari, Inc.
v. North Am. Philips Consumer Electronic Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)).
13. Id. (brackets in original).
14. Additional problems arise from the use of terms such as "substantial similarity" where the
similarities being considered need not be substantial at all. These problems will be addressed as they
arise in subsequent discussions.
15. Stillman, 720 F. Supp. at 1357.
16. Id.
17. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
18. It should be noted that some courts, particularly those within the Ninth Circuit, have adopted
a different approach that does not treat the question of improper appropriation as a separate, distinct,
element of the infringement test. According to this approach, the test for copyright infringement
requires proof of copyright ownership and copying by the defendant. Copying is proven by access
and substantial similarity. Substantial similarity is proven by showing substantial similarity of ideas
and substantial similarity of expression. The question of whether the defendant's copying amounts to
improper appropriation of the plaintiff's protected expression is not explicitly considered, but rather,
is implicit in the courts' consideration of the similarities in the works at issue.
In the courts that follow Arnstein, however, copying and improper appropriation are clearly
treated as separate, distinct, issues. In these jurisdictions, proof of copyright infringement can be
shown by proof of copyright ownership and copying by the defendant. Copying in turn is proven by 4
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1. Access
Access in the context of copyright infringement means that the defendant had
an opportunity to view or hear the plaintiff's work. It is important to note that
the plaintiff need not show that the defendant actually viewed the work, she need
only show that the defendant had an opportunity to do so. 9 A showing of ac-
cess thus establishes that the defendant had an opportunity to view, and more im-
portantly, an opportunity to copy, the plaintiff's work." This showing of access
is necessary because, without access, it is impossible that the defendant copied
the plaintiff's work.
Although the general rule is that there must be some showing of access to
sustain an infringement action, it has been widely accepted that access may be
inferred if the allegedly infringing work is "strikingly similar" to the copyrighted
work.2 Striking similarity has often been defined as ."similarities... that can
only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation,
or prior common source,"' or alternatively, "similarity ... of a type which
will preclude any explanation other than that of copying."'
It is important to note here that a finding that the defendant's work is strik-
ingly similar to plaintiff's does not eliminate the requirement of access as a
condition to proving infringement. Instead, striking similarity gives rise to an
inference of access by negating the possibility that the work could have been
derived from independent creation, common source or some other work besides
the plaintiff's. This distinction is important to keep in mind because, although a
showing of striking similarity allows the court to infer access, 24 most courts will
still require that there be at least a bare possibility that defendant had access to
plaintiff's work.'
evidence of access, similarities sufficient to prove copying and proof that the copying amounts to
unlawful appropriation of the plaintiff's protected expression.
We will see in later discussions that the rationale and the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's anal-
ysis is questionable and subject to much criticism. The organization of this paper is in accordance
with Arnstein as it provides a sound foundation on which to build and makes for a more logical
analysis of the issues to be addressed.
19. See NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A].
20. Id.
21. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469. See also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.02[B] ("If... the
similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's works is sufficiently striking and substantial the trier of
fact may be permitted to infer copying notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to prove access.").
22. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 1984) [(citing Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198,
203 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Stratchbomeo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403
(S.D.N.Y. 1973))].
23. Selle, 741 F.2d at 905.
24. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir.
1990).
25. But see Selle, 741 F.2d at 902 (holding that, despite a showing of striking similarity, "a
defendant's opportunity to view the copyrighted work must exist by a reasonable possibility - not a
bare possibility") (quoting Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp 198, 202-03 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Contra Gaste
v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (explicitly rejecting Selle on this point and stating
that, in the Second Circuit, striking similarity sufficient to preclude the possibility of independent
1995]
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Under this exception to the rule, a greater showing of similarity (as in striking
similarity) will allow for a lesser showing of access. It has been suggested that
the converse - that, as the showing of access increases, the required degree of
similarity that need be shown, will decrease - is a valid proposition. Indeed,
courts and commentators alike have supported this "inverse-ratio" rule in princi-
pal.26 But the underlying rationale is suspect and, in application, is unsound2 7
To illustrate, consider Nimmer's analysis on this issue. He begins his discus-
sion of the "inverse-ratio" rule by recognizing that "clear and convincing evi-
dence of access will not avoid the necessity of also proving substantial similarity,
because access without similarity cannot create an inference of copying."' Af-
ter recognizing that, in this most extreme application, the rule is unsound,
Nimmer then re-asserts the validity of the "rule" in stating that, "given that a
very high degree of similarity is required in order to dispense with proof of
access, it must logically follow that where proof of access is offered, the re-
quired degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would be necessary in the
absence of such proof."'29
But the problem here is that Nimmer merely restates the exception discussed
above, that where striking similarity is shown, the showing of access may be
lessened or dispensed with. It does not follow, however, that as the showing of
access increases, the required showing of similarity decreases as on a sliding
scale. As will be discussed momentarily, the degree of similarity necessary to
prove copying need not be substantial in any event, the similarities need only be
probative of copying." Such similarities may or may not be substantial. Thus,
regardless of the quantum of proof as to access, the requisite showing of simi-
larities necessary to establish copying is a threshold matter and not one of de-
gree.3 From this it logically flows that the similarities necessary to establish
creation is sufficient, absent any proof of access, to support a finding of infringement).
26. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1172 (9th Cir. 1977) (" ... where clear and convincing evidence of access is presented, the quantum
of proof required to show substantial similarity may... be lower than when access is shown merely
by a preponderance of the evidence."); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 663 F. Supp. 706,
714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("As defendants have conceded access to plaintiff's copyrighted illustration, a
somewhat lesser degree of similarity suffices to establish a copyright infringement than might other-
wise be required."); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[D] (suggesting that "[since] a very high degree
of similarity is required in order to dispense with proof of access, it must logically follow that where
proof of access is offered, the required degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would be
necessary in the absence of such proof") (emphasis in original).
27. See Justice Clark's opinion in Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961),
rejecting the "inverse-ratio" rule and stating that
We fear that counsel with that semantic proclivity natural to our profession have allowed
themselves to be seduced by a superficially attractive apophthegm which upon examina-
tion confuses more than it clarifies. The logical outcome of the claimed principle is obvi-
ously that proof of actual access will render a showing of similarities entirely unnecessary.
28. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[D].
29. Id (emphasis in original).
30. See infra section 11(B)(2)(a).
31. Even if access is admitted, the presence of similarities probative of copying remains the same.
The required showing of similarities does not change as the quantum of proof concerning access
6
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copying do not decrease in any event, and any "inverse-ratio" rule suggesting
such is unsound.
Returning to our initial discussion of striking similarity, it should be noted
that even in cases where there is a finding of striking similarity, a defendant may
rebut the presumption of copying if it can be proved that her work resulted from
independent creation32 or that the work is derived from a common source other
than the allegedly infringed work.33 Copyright infringement requires copying of
a plaintiff's protected expression. Thus, proof that the work was created absent
copying of the plaintiff's work is an affirmative defense to an action for copy-
right infringement.
If the plaintiff can show striking similarity between the two works, and the
defendant cannot prove that her work is the result of independent creation or is
derived from the same source as the plaintiff's, the question then is whether that
similarity extends to such a qualitatively significant portion of plaintiff's protect-
ed expression that it amounts to improper appropriation and thus warrants a
finding of copyright infringement.34 If, however, plaintiff does not show striking
similarity, but does establish access, she must first show that the defendant's
work contains similarities that support an inference of copying before proceeding
to the question of improper appropriation.
2. Copying
This part of the copyright infringement test is commonly referred to as in-
quiring whether the two works are substantially similar, thus supporting an infer-
ence that the defendant copied from plaintiff's work. However, this formulation
is not entirely accurate and results in large part from the improper use of the
"substantial similarity" terminology by the courts. The use of this terminology
has led to considerable confusion as to what elements of the works need to be
substantially similar and under what part of the inquiry. The following is an
attempt to clarify these issues and to properly formulate the inquiry as to copying
increases or decreases. The same is true for similarities under the improper appropriation step. The
similarities must be sufficient to justify a finding of improper appropriation. The necessary quantum
of similarities does not decrease due to a stronger showing of access.
32. Unlike patent law, the copyright statute does not grant the copyright holder an exclusive
monopoly on the protected work. The copyright statute protects against unauthorized copying of
protected expression. As proof of independent creation precludes the possibility of copying, indepen-
dent creation is an affirmative defense in a copyright infringement action. See NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT, § 13.01[B] ("despite proof of access and probative similarity, the trier of fact may be upheld
in finding no copying if such trier believes the defendant's evidence of independent creation ... ").
In contrast, patent law would allow a finding of infringement even in a case where the defendant
could prove independent creation. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1989) ("whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent... in-
fringes the patent").
33. See NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.0l[B] [("If defendant in fact copied from a work other than
plaintiff's (and such work is not itself copied from the plaintiff's) it is irrelevant in plaintiff's in-
fringement claim that the defendant may have infringed the copyright in such other work")].
34. The issue of improper appropriation is considered infta section Il(B)(3).
7
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under Arnstein's first prong.
a. Confusion Arises From The Use Of The Term "Substantial Similarity."
In considering the current formulations of the copyright infringement test, it
should be noted that Judge Frank, who wrote the Arnstein35 opinion, did not use
the term "substantial similarity."36 Judge Frank's opinion in Arnstein stated the
test for copyright infringement as follows: "If there is evidence of access and
SIMLAREs exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similar-
ities are SUFFICIENT TO PROVE COPYING.... If copying is established ....
then ... there arise[s] the second issue, that of illicit copying (improper appro-
priation)."37 Thus, after considering the issue of access, the Arnstein test calls
for a two part inquiry in determining whether the defendant infringed the
plaintiff's copyright. The first question is whether the defendant copied from
plaintiff's work, and the second, whether such copying constitutes improper
appropriation of the plaintiff's protected expression." It is significant that on
the question of copying as an initial matter, the Arnstein court did not suggest
that the similarities need be substantial, but sufficient.
In terms of copyright infringement, similarities between the plaintiff's and
defendant's works may establish one or more of the following facts: first, as
discussed in the preceding section on access, striking similarities may substitute
for direct proof of access; 9 second, similarities between the two works, when
combined with proof of access, may support an inference of copying by the
defendant (as in the first prong of the Arnstein test); and finally, similarities may
support a finding of unlawful appropriation (as in the second prong of the
Arnstein test).' The confusion arises in the post-Arnstein courts' use of the
term substantial similarity in their opinions without distinguishing which part of
the copyright infringement test is being addressed. In many cases a court will use
the term "substantial similarity" without stating whether it is discussing the simi-
larities with respect to the question of copying or whether it is addressing the
question of improper appropriation.
Adding to this confusion is the fact that many courts do not treat the question
of improper appropriation as a second, separate, inquiry.41 In Sid & Marty
Kroffi Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,42 the Ninth Circuit
35. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
36. See Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (1990) ("in describing the
[copying] element, Judge Frank does not use the phrase 'substantial similarity' even though later
cases citing Arnstein generally suggest that he did").
37. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. See supra section 1(B)(1).
40. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGrr, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocTRNEs,
715 (3d ed., Foundation Press 1990).
41. See supra note 18, discussing the different approaches to copyright infringement analysis.
42. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. V:43
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"applied a somewhat cloudy gloss"'43 to the Arnstein test." In setting out its
interpretation of the copyright infringement test in Krofft, the Ninth Circuit re-
ferred to the first prong of the Arnstein test as an "extrinsic" test, the purpose of
which is "[tihe determination of whether there is SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARrrY in
[the] ideas" upon which the works are based.4' Krofft then referred to the sec-
ond prong of the Arnstein test as an "intrinsic" test which required that the trier
of fact "decide whether there is SUBSTANTIAL simiLARrrY in the expression of
the ideas so as to constitute infringement."' The soundness of Krofft's formula-
tion of the copyright infringement test is questionable for a number of reasons.47
The concern here, however, is the confusion caused by the use of the term "sub-
stantial similarity" in the context of the copyright infringement analysis.
In an enlightening article discussing this issue in depth,' Professor Alan
Latman states correctly that the use of "substantial similarity" in referring to the
first prong of the Arnstein test is improper and misleading.' Recognizing that
the only issue to be determined under Arnstein's first prong is whether the
works' similarities are sufficient to show copying of the plaintiff's work, Pro-
fessor Latman has proposed that the term "probative similarity" be used as an
alternative to "substantial similarity" under this part of the Arnstein test. If such
probative similarities are found, the question of whether the similarities are sub-
stantial, thus warranting a finding of infringement, will then be considered under
the test's second, improper appropriation, prong.
Incorporating Professor Latman's terminology, the Arnstein test for substantial
similarity has recently been stated by the Second Circuit as requiring that
A plaintiff must first show that his or her work was actually copied. Copying
may be established... by... evidence [of] ... similarities that are PROBA-
TrvE of copying between the works.... If... copying is established, a
plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an improper appropriation
by demonstrating that SUBSTArLAL SmImARHY to protected material exists
43. See GOLDSTEiN, supra note 40, at 714.
44. Kroffi formulated the Arnstein test in terms of the idea/expression dichotomy, which holds
that an author's expression, not her idea is copyrightable. The idea/expression dichotomy is an ac-
cepted underpinning of modem copyright law and is codified in § 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1989). The idea/expression dichotomy is discussed in greater detail infra
section fl(B)(3)(a).
45. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. As a practical matter, Kroffi's extrinsic test virtually precluded the possibility of an in-
fringement case being decided for the defendant on summary judgment grounds. See infra note 57
and accompanying text. More importantly, however, the extrinsic test's evaluation of only similarities
of unprotected ideas makes little sense considering that the question facing the court is whether the
similarities suggest that the defendant copied from the plaintiff's work, not whether such copying is
sufficient to wan-ant a finding of improper appropriation. Similarities evidencing copying as an initial
matter may arise in either the protected or the unprotected elements of the works. Recognizing the
shortcomings of Kroffi's infringement analysis, later decisions by the Ninth Circuit have modified
Krofft to avoid these problems. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
48. See Latrnan, supra note 36.
49. Kroffl's extrinsic test which requires a showing of "substantial similarity in ideas," is a good
example.
1995]
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between the two works.O
In addition to the recent opinions from the Second Circuit which have adopted
this terminology, the use of "probative similarity" in place of "substantial simi-
larity" under the first part of the Arnstein test has been recognized and endorsed
by the leading commentators.5 Thus, after ownership and access, the next issue
that must be addressed under the Arnstein test is whether it can be shown that
the defendant copied from plaintiff's work, as evidenced by similarities that are
probative of copying. We will consider this issue first, and then we will turn to
the question of improper appropriation.
b. Determining Whether There Are Similarities Probative Of Copying.
On the question of probative similarity, most courts follow Arnstein in holding
that the two works in question are to be compared in their entirety. 2 Thus the
comparison extends to both the protected and unprotected elements of the works.
In making this comparison, analysis and dissection of the works is permissible,
as is the use of expert testimony. 3 If this comparison reveals similarities that
are probative of copying, only then will the trier of fact consider the question of
improper appropriation.54
According to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Krofft, however, the first prong of
its analysis, the "extrinsic" test, allows for a comparison of the works' ideas
only. Under Krofft, a comparison of the protected expression is deferred until the
second part of its analysis, which the court termed as an "intrinsic" test."
The soundness of Krofft's reasoning on this matter is questionable. 6 If the
issue being considered at this stage of the infringement analysis is whether the
defendant copied from the plaintiff's work, surely such copying can be demon-
strated by similarities in protected expression as much as by similarities to the
unprotected elements of the plaintiff's work. Additionally, the Krofft formulation
of the extrinsic test created an even more fundamental problem; because similar-
50. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
51. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A]; 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT - PRINCIPLES, LAW
AND PRACTICE, § 7.2.1.2 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
52. See, e.g., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E] (citing Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1946)).
53. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232
(3d Cir. 1986); Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (N.D. 111. 1989).
54. If such similarities are not found, summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate. This
flows logically from the fact that there can be no finding of infringement without a showing that the
defendant copied from plaintiff's work.
55. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
56. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E] (suggesting that Krofft "unnecessarily limits the
scope of the court's determination under the preliminary, extrinsic test" and urging that "future deci-
sions will view the scope of the extrinsic test as that suggested by Arnstein rather than that adopted
in Kroffl").
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ities in the works' underlying ideas would almost always be found, Krofft virtu-
ally eliminated the possibility of a case being decided for the defendant on sum-
mary judgment grounds.57
Recognizing the problems created by the Krofft formulation of its extrinsic
test, and realizing that the separation of ideas and expression is more appropri-
ately deferred until the unlawful appropriation portion of the infringement test, s
recent cases in the Ninth Circuit have whittled away at Krofft's limitation as to
the consideration of only unprotectible ideas under the extrinsic test.59
In Shaw v. Lindheim,6° the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's summary
judgment for the defendant in a copyright infringement case involving a televi-
sion series entitled "The Equalizer."' In its decision, the court broke with
57. See id. Nimmer states that:
The effect of the Krofft bifurcated test is to expand the domain of the trier of fact, and
greatly to contract the role of the court, at least in its power to rule for the defendant as a
matter of law. It is true that Krofft concludes that the extrinsic test "may often be decided
as a matter of law;" however, because the only issue under this test is that of idea simi-
larity, and because in almost all copyright litigation the plaintiff will not file an action
unless there is at a minimum some similarity of ideas, under Kroffi a court will rarely
have the power to rule for the defendant in advance of trial ....
58. Under Kroffi's articulation of the extrinsic test, the difficult task of separating ideas from
expression is undertaken in each case as a preliminary step to the extrinsic test. Because Krofft's
extrinsic test virtually precludes the possibility of summary judgement for the defendant (a finding of
similarities between the works' ideas is almost always found, thus requiring that the matter proceed
to the finder of fact), the idea/expression analysis is rarely avoided. Under Arnstein's articulation, if
similarities probative of copying are not found, summary judgment is properly granted and the diffi-
cult task of separating ideas from expression is avoided.
59. See Ellen M. Bierman, It Walks Like a Duck, Talks Like a Duck,... But Is It a Duck? Mak-
ing Sense of Substantial Similarity Law as it Applies to User Interfaces, 16 U. PUGET SoUND L. REV.
319 (1992). Bierman notes that recent cases have modified Krofft's extrinsic test to the point where it
now allows for analysis of both ideas and expression. Among the cases cited by Bierman are: Jason
v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing analysis
of a literary work's plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace and sequence under the extrinsic test);
Litchfield v. Speilberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (allowing
consideration of the same elements in a case involving the movie, E.T.); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d
1289 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing consideration of plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace and se-
quence under the extrinsic test in a case involving movie and screen treatments); McCulloch v. Price,
823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing comparison, under the extrinsic test, of the similarities in the
"objective details" of artistic works); Narrell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing
analysis of literary characters under the extrinsic test); and Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.
1990) (reformulating Krofft's extrinsic test into an "objective" test for similarity of expression in
cases involving literary works).
The application of an "objective" test as set forth in Shaw was expanded beyond the context of
literary works in Brown Bag Software v. Symantee Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992). See infra p. 16.
60. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
61. Shaw had entered into a contract with NBC Television which gave NBC the option to devel-
op a television series based on a pilot script developed by Shaw entitled "The Equalizer." This script
was delivered to Lindheim who worked for NBC. Lindheim acknowledged having read Shaw's script
but NBC declined to produce the show. Under the terms of the option contract, the rights to "The
Equalizer" reverted back to Shaw.
Lindheim left NBC approximately one year later to work for Universal Television. While at
11
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Krofft and held that "the extrinsic test... can no longer be seen as a test for
mere similarity of ideas." 2 The court then stated that the extrinsic test is "more
sensibly" described as an "objective" test while the Krofft intrinsic test would
appropriately be labeled as a "subjective" test.' Thus, Shaw retreated from
Krofft in allowing for comparison of both ideas and expression under the first
prong of the ArnsteinlKrofft test. It should be noted, however, that Shaw was
very explicit in limiting its expansive reading of the "extrinsic" test to infringe-
ment cases involving literary works.'
Another Ninth Circuit case, Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,' was
an appeal from summary judgment for the defendant in an infringement action
involving computer outlining programs. The court's opinion in Brown Bag en-
dorsed the lower court's objective analysis of both ideas and expression under
what was formerly the Krofft extrinsic test. In doing so, the court followed Shaw
in recognizing that "the extrinsic test looks at more than just similarity of
ideas." 7 Most importantly, however, the Brown Bag court made it very clear
that its expansive reading of Krofft's extrinsic test was not limited to literary
works.'
At least one other circuit is in agreement as to the evaluation of both ideas
and expression when looking for similarities probative of copying. In Stillman v.
Leo Burnett Corp.,' the plaintiff brought action for copyright infringement and
other claims against Leo Burnett Corp. for allegedly copying his "silent" televi-
sion commercial. In a thorough review of the Seventh Circuit's previous deci-
sions in this area, decisions which drew heavily from Krofft and other Ninth Cir-
cuit opinions,0 the court was clear in stating that to establish copying, a plain-
tiff must show "similarity between the works 'when compared in their entirety
including both protectible [sic] and unprotectible [sic] material.'' '
In considering the approaches described above, it is obvious that, despite the
variations in terminology, and the Ninth Circuit's temporary aberration in Krofft,
Universal, Lindheim developed a television series treatment entitled "The Equalizer." Lindheim's
treatment, in a revised and expanded version, ultimately served as the pilot script for a CBS televi-
sion series entitled "The Equalizer."
62. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 535.
63. I
64. Id. It should be noted, however, that the objective/subjective terms were originally included in
the Ninth Circuit's draft opinion for Kroffi. But in its final opinion, the court used the extrin-
sic/intrinsic labels which it considered more consistent with its application of the idea/expression
dichotomy to Arnstein's infringement analysis. See also Steven Knowles & Ronald Jason Palmieri,
Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 109 (1980)
(discussing Krofft in detail and suggesting that the Ninth Circuit adopt the objective/subjective termi-
nology in lieu of the extrinsic/intrinsic labels used in Krofft).
65. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 535.
66. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 198 (1992).
67. Id. at 1475.
68. Id.
69. 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
70. Id. at 1357-1359.
71. Id. at 1358.
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the courts begin with an analysis of the two works in question to determine
whether there are similarities that support a finding that the defendant copied
from the plaintiff's work. In performing this analysis, the courts will dissect the
defendant's work and use expert testimony if necessary to determine whether
such copying has taken place. This will entail an analysis of the works in their
entirety, that is, the inquiry into similarities probative of copying will entail a
comparison of the works' protected expression as well as their underlying ideas.
If such copying is established, the court will then consider the question of im-
proper appropriation.
3. Improper Appropriation
The fact that the defendant copied from the plaintiff's work, standing alone, is
not enough to prove copyright infringement. The defendant's copying must be
shown to have extended to the plaintiff's protected expression, and additionally,
the copied expression must have been of such qualitative value as to warrant a
finding of infringement."
a. Determining What Is Protectible - The IdealExpression Dichotomy.
In the seminal case of Baker v. Selden 3 the Supreme Court established the
proposition that copyright protection extends to the expression of an idea and not
to the idea itself. Selden had written and copyrighted a book in which he ex-
plained a new accounting system he had developed. Included in the copyrighted
work were copies of accounting forms necessary for Selden's new system. Baker
subsequently began selling accounting forms similar to Selden's and Selden
brought an action for copyright infringement. Although Selden prevailed on his
claim in the lower courts, the Supreme Court reversed and found that Selden's
copyright extended to his explanation of the new accounting system but not to
it's underlying idea. The Court felt that the accounting forms were not expressive
but were a necessary incident to the use of the system. Because Baker used only
Selden's idea, not the expression of that idea, he did not infringe Selden's copy-
right.7
4
The basic holding of Selden, that copyright protection extends to an author's
expression but not to the idea(s) underlying that expression, is now accepted as
fundamental. This concept is commonly known as the idea/expression dichotomy
and is expressly recognized in section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act.75 The
72. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A] ('The quantitative relation of the similar material to
the total material contained in plaintiff's work is certainly of importance. However, even if the simi-
lar material is quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively important the trier of fact may properly find
[improper appropriation].").
73. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
74. Baker used Selden's idea to create a compatible version of the forms necessary for Selden's
accounting system. Thus, Baker copied Selden's idea but not the expression of that idea.
75. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C.
19951
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fact that the idea/expression dichotomy has become a basic tenet of modem
copyright law does not, however, make for an easy determination of what is
protectible and what is not.
To reach this end, the courts have articulated several tests for distinguishing
protected expression from the unprotected elements of a particular work. The
most widely cited of these is Judge Learned Hand's "abstractions" test set forth
in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.76 In distinguishing unprotected ideas
from protected expression, Judge Hand suggested the following analysis:
Upon any work .... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could
prevent the use of his "ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended. 7
While Judge Hand's abstractions test clearly states the issue correctly, and de-
spite its helpfulness in making a theoretical determination as to the different
elements, or levels of abstraction, within a given work, the test does not tell us at
what point the plaintiff's work has crossed the line from the realm of
unprotectible ideas into that of protected expression.78 Thus, despite its helpful-
ness in breaking down a work into its constituent elements, the abstractions test
does not tell us the level of abstraction at which the plaintiff will have crossed
the line into the area of protected expression. 9
A second test for distinguishing ideas from protected expression, often re-
ferred to as the "pattern" test, was set out by Professor Zechariah Chaffee some
fifteen years after Judge Hand's decision in Nichols.' Professor Chaffee stated
the problem, and his solution, as follows: "No doubt the line [between
unprotectible ideas and protected expression] does lie somewhere between the
author's idea and the precise form in which he wrote it down. I like to say that
the protection covers the 'pattern' of the work .... the sequence of events and
the development of the interplay of characters."'"
The problem is that the pattern test is only helpful in theory, not in practice.
§ 102(b) (1989).
76. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
77. Id. at 121.
78. See David Nimmer, et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of
Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 625, 636 (1988) ("This test
does not answer the question of where the dividing line exists for a given work, but rather provides a
method of analyzing a work to determine where the line should be drawn.").
79. See Matthew M. Fortnow, Note, Why the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software Should Not
Receive Copyright Protection, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 421, 439 (1992) ("One problem with this test is
that the court arbitrarily determines the exact 'point in the series of abstractions' separating idea from
expression.").
80. Zechariah Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503 (1945).
81. Id. at 513.
[Vol. V:43
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Its primary flaw is that, like the abstractions test, it does not tell us where the
line between unprotectible ideas and protected expression should be drawn.
Whether such a test is possible, or even desirable, is uncertain. But at least one
commentator has stated that "[tihe problem is probably susceptible to no more
precise a principle than that of the Chaffee 'pattern' test.
' '9
While this test is more precise than the abstractions test in its rather explicit
statement of what elements of a literary work should be considered protectible, a
major drawback is its specific application to literary works. Clearly the test is not
helpful in cases involving works not consisting of a "sequence of events" or "the
development of the interplay of characters." In these cases, the pattern test may
not encompass all of the protected elements of a given work. 3 Thus, while
helpful in separating idea and expression in literary works, the pattern test is of
little usefulness in cases involving other types of works and thus leaves much to
be desired.
Aside from Hand's abstractions test and Chaffee's pattern test, recent deci-
sions have espoused other approaches for establishing what is protected expres-
sion as compared to unprotectible ideas. One popular approach extends protec-
tion to the "total concept and feel" of a plaintiff's work.84 In its opinion in Roth
Greetings Cards v. United Card Co.,85 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in its greeting cards, stating that, "it ap-
pears to us that in total concept and feel the cards of [the defendant] are the
same as the copyrighted cards ... ."6 The court based this conclusion on its
finding that "the characters depicted in the art work, the mood they portrayed,
the combination of art work conveying a particular mood with a particular mes-
sage, and the arrangement of the words on the [defendant's] greeting cards are
substantially the same as in the [plaintiff's]."'
Since Roth, the "total concept and feel" approach has been applied by numer-
82. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A][l][b].
83. For example, it is difficult to understand how the pattern test would be of much help in deter-
mining the protectability of source code, object code, data structure, and the like, in an infringement
action involving computer programs.
84. This "concept and feel" terminology is derived from trademark law where the concern is the
likelihood of confusion among consumers. Two works that are similar in "concept and feel" may
indeed be likely to cause confusion among consumers. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-
Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (in an action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), the court was clear in recognizing the plaintiff's protectible interest in the over-
all appearance of its "Care-Bear" stuffed animals). Copyright, however, does not protect against such
confusion, it protects against copying of protected expression. Even if the works at issue are similar
in "concept and feel," a finding of copyright infringement may be unwarranted. The similarities in
"concept and feel" may derive from unprotected elements, licensed expression or material that is in
the public domain. Thus, while a "concept and feel" approach may be appropriate in cases involving
trademarks (and under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act), its application to copyright law is ill found-
ed.
85. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
86. Id. at 1110.
87. Id.
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ous courts, including several outside the Ninth Circuit.8 However, the most
widely cited decision invoking the "concept and feel" analysis is probably the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Krofft9 where the court found that the defendant's
"McDonaldland" television commercials appropriated the "total concept and feel"
of the plaintiff's H.R. Pufnstuf children's show.
Despite the acceptance of the "concept and feel" approach within the Ninth
Circuit and other circuits, the approach has been criticized by courts and com-
mentators alike.'o Extending copyright protection to the "concept and feel," or
"look and feel," as it is sometimes referred to, is a troubling proposition' "One
problem with protecting the [concept] and feel of a [work] is that no one knows
what [concept] and feel means." 2 Also, there is no single common definition of
"concept and feel" as used by the various circuits.93 None of the courts that ap-
ply this test have attempted to define these terms.
Perhaps even more significant than the lack of a clear definition of "concept
88. Gund, Inc. v. Applause, Inc., 809 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering the "total concept and
feel" of two stuffed dogs in denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction); Atari, Inc. v.
North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (extending protection to the
"total concept and feel" of plaintiff's PAC MAN video game); Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976) (applying a "total concept
and feel" analysis in an infringement action involving children's books); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement
World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981) (using a "total concept and feel" analysis in denying
plaintiff's claim for infringement of its "Asteroids" video game).
89. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977).
90. See Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that "[wlhat is important is not whether there is substantial similarity in the total con-
cept and feel of the works.., but whether the ... protectible [sic] expression in [plaintiff's] cata-
log is substantially similar to the equivalent portions of [defendant's] catalog); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software, Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62 (D. Mass. 1990) ("I have not found the 'look and
feel' concept.., to be significantly helpful in distinguishing between nonliteral elements of a com-
puter program that are copyrightable and those that are not"); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623
F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting the absence of "an easily perceived general aura or
feeling emanating from a silicon chip" as grounds for rejecting the "concept and feel" approach);
NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[AI[1][c] (suggesting that the "concept and feel" approach be aban-
doned); Fortnow, supra note 79 (arguing that protection of the "look and feel" of computer programs
"is not only at odds with copyright law, [but is also] at odds with the long-term health of the com-
puter industry); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the IdealExpression Dichotomy
and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 411 (1989) (referring to
the abstract nature of the "concept and feel" analysis and stating that "[i]f copyright claims can...
be maintained at such a high level of abstraction, practically any similarity could conceivably support
a finding of infringement").
91. Although the term "concept and feel" is different from "look and feel," the two terms are
often used interchangeably. A "concept" is analogous to an idea underlying a particular work. A
work's look may arise from either protectible and/or unprotectible elements of a work. Protection of
either is problematic as the result is often the protection of elements not properly within the scope of
the copyright statute. Protection of a work's "feel," is also problematic as it results not from an anal-
ysis of the specific protectible elements of the works at issue, but rather, from a subjective analysis of
an abstract, undefined concept.
92. Fortoow, supra note 79, at 425.
93. Id.
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and feel," is the fact that extending protection to a work's concept is contrary to
the specific language of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act?4 which clearly
states that "[ifn no case does copyright protection... extend to any ... con-
cept.... regardless of the form in which it is... embodied in [a given]
work." 5 As for protecting the "feel" of a particular work, it has been stated that
"the reference to the 'feel' of a work is either a total vaguery [sic] or another
invitation to protect the unprotectible." Recognizing the inconsistencies and
contradictions of the concept and feel approach, numerous courts have rejected
it.
97
It should be noted that each of the previously discussed approaches originated
from cases involving literary and artistic works. More recently, however, several
other tests for determining what is protectible expression have been developed in
cases involving the infringement of computer programs. In one such case,
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,9 the Third Circuit extended protection
to the structure, sequence and organization of the plaintiff's computer program.
The court in Whelan defined the underlying idea upon which the plaintiff's pro-
gram was based as the "efficient organization of a dental laboratory."9 The
court then held that the non-literal elements, including the structure, sequence
and organization of the program were protected expression.'"
Although most commentators agree that the court in Whelan reached the cor-
rect result in finding infringement of the plaintiff's work, the court's willingness
to extend copyright protection to such broad and undefined elements as structure,
sequence and organization has been harshly criticized.' 1 Extending protection
to non-literal elements of a work is widely accepted as proper, °" but most
courts and commentators feel Whelan simply goes too far.
In it's statement that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be
the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function
would be part of the expression of the idea,"'0 3 the Whelan court extended the
scope of protection well beyond the line of protectible expression and into the
area of unprotectible ideas. Perhaps David Nimmer put the problem most suc-
94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1989).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1989).
96. Mitchell Zimmerman, Substantial Similarity of Computer Programs After Brown Bag, 9 No. 7
COMPurER LAW. 6, 16 n.7 (July 1992).
97. See supra note 90.
98. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
99. Id. at 1240.
100. Id. at 1248 ("We hold that... copyright protection of computer programs may extend be-
yond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization.").
101. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (setting
out a lengthy list of decisions and law review articles critical of the Whelan decision).
102. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass. 1990)
("copying of nonliteral expression, if sufficiently extensive, has never been upheld as permissible
copying; rather, it has always been viewed as copying of elements of an expression of creative origi-
nality').
103. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d Cir. 1986).
1995]
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cinctly when he stated that "[t]he crucial flaw of this reasoning is that it assumes
that only one 'idea,' in copyright terms underlies a computer program, and that
once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be expression."'
By failing to recognize that a computer program consists of not one, but a
series of ideas, the Whelan court granted protection (to the plaintiffs) that ex-
tends well beyond that authorized under the copyright statute. From a policy
standpoint this decision is problematic as it deters others from building upon
ideas and concepts that belong in the public domain. Additionally, overprotection
discourages creativity and advancement of the useful arts"° by interjecting un-
certainty into this area of the law. For example, a software developer who is
uncertain as to the level of protection that will be afforded to her competitor's
product will likely steer clear of any project that could possibly infringe upon her
competitor's copyrights. The result is a chilling effect on creativity and innova-
tion.l"
Another method for separating ideas from expression, that originated in the
area of computer programs, is to combine Judge Hand's abstractions test with a
"successive filtration approach." This ,method is based on the premise that after
the abstraction and "filtering" out of all unprotected elements of the plaintiff's
work, there will remain a core of protectible expression against which the
defendant's work can be compared." The filtration approach was recently
adopted by the Second Circuit in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.19
In Altai, the court, in considering the scope of protectible expression in the
plaintiff's copyrighted computer program, began by applying Hand's abstractions
test to break down the work into its constituent elements. The court then "fil-
tered" out such unprotectible elements as those dictated by efficiency, hardware
requirements and mechanical specifications."0 The court also filtered out those
104. David Nimmer, et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Com-
puter Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIz. ST. LJ. 625, 639 (1988).
105. Id. at 630 ("Providing protection for such amorphous concepts as the "overall structure" of a
[computer] program, without considering whether such a structure is protectible under traditional
copyright theories, increases the risk of granting copyright holders protection on par with that of
patent holders.").
106. The underlying purpose of copyright protection is "[tro promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective
writings .... U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
107. But cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 98 (D. Mass. 1992) (dis-
counting this argument against broad protection of computer programs as a deterrent to innovation
and stating that "[t]he argument that a little copying ... here and there in a very large work should
be allowed to promote the development of great works is a policy argument Congress has rejected.").
108. The "comparison" used under this approach is a modified version of the lay observer test
which is discussed in detail infra section II(B)(3)(b).
109. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
110. Those elements dictated by efficiency concerns were "filtered" out as unprotected expression
based on the idea/expression merger theory. This theory holds that "'[w]hen there is essentially only
one way to express an idea, the idea and expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copy-
ing that expression."' Id. at 707 (citing Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc.,
843 F.2d 600, 606 (Ist Cir. 1988) (brackets in original)). Altai explained the application of the
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elements that it found to be in the public domain."' After the filtration process,
the court was left with a core of protectible expression which it compared to the
defendant's allegedly infringing work."' The court failed to find substantial
similarities between the defendant's work and the plaintiff's protectible expres-
sion, and thus ruled in favor of the defendant." 3
idea/expression merger in the context of efficient computer program routines by stating that:
While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a computer programmer
may effectuate certain functions within a program, - i.e., express the idea embodied in a
given subroutine - efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to
make only one or two forms of expression workable options ... . It follows that in order
to determine whether the merger doctrine precludes copyright protection to an aspect of a
program's structure that is so oriented, a court must inquire "whether the use of a particu-
lar set of modules is necessary to implement that part of the program's process" being
implemented... . If the answer is yes, then the expression represented by the
programmer's choice of a specific module or group of modules has merged with their
underlying idea and is unprotected.
Id. at 708 (citing NIhMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[F][2] and Steven R. Englund, Note, Determining
the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 866,
902 (1990)).
With respect to hardware requirements and mechanical specifications, these elements are prop-
erly filtered out because
in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular func-
tions in a specific computing environment without standard techniques." This is a result of
the fact that a programmer's freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic
considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a par-
ticular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with
which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers' de-
sign standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted pro-
gramming practices within the computer industry.
Id at 709-10 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03 [F][3]).
111. Elements that are in the public domain are available for all to use and may not be appropriat-
ed by any individual to the exclusion of others.
112. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 710.
113. Altai's problems began when it hired a programmer named Amey to help in the creation of a
computer program that was to compete with a program offered by Computer Associates (CA). Amey
had been working at CA when he was approached by an Altai employee who convinced him to leave
CA and work for Altai. It was not known to Altai, however, that Arney brought with him from CA
an unauthorized copy of the object code for CA's competing program. Without the knowledge of
Altai, Arney proceeded to copy significant portions CA's object code as part of the Altai program.
After Altai's program was introduced, CA suspected that parts of its program might have been copied
by Altai. After CA confirmed its suspicions it filed suit against Altai for copyright infringement and
misappropriation of trade secrets. Altai did not learn of Arney's actions until it received a summons
and complaint, at which point Arney confirmed his copying of the CA object code.
After seeking advice from counsel, Altai attempted to salvage its program by deleting all por-
tions of the CA code from its program (the copied portions of the code were identified by Amey).
The program was then given to several other programmers, none of whom had worked on the origi-
nal version of the Altai program. The goal was to have the group "reconstruct" the Altai program
without access to the CA program or the earlier, "tainted" version of the Altai program (this method
of developing computer programs is known as a "clean room" approach). After completing its new,
"clean" version of the program, Altai shipped only the new version to its customers. It also offered
"free upgrades" to all individuals owning copies of the earlier "tainted" version of the program.
At trial, the district court considered the two version of the Altai program separately in terms
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In addition to the Second Circuit, other courts have applied a filtration type
approach in cases involving computer programs,"' stuffed toy animals," 5 au-
to parts catalogs,"6 home video games," 7 and promotional travel videos."'
It has also been suggested that a filtration approach should be used regardless of
the type of work under consideration." 9 Whether such a broad application of
this approach will be adopted by the courts remains to be seen. Hopefully the
preceding discussion has shown that a single filtration approach is preferable to
the numerous approaches currently being used for separating the protectible from
the unprotectible elements of various types of works.
b. Determining Whether The Defendant's Copying Amounts To Improper
Appropriation Of The Plaintiffs Protected Expression - The Lay Observer
Test.2o
The above discussion's focus is on the current methods for establishing
whether a defendant has copied from a plaintiff's work and the methods for
determining what elements of the plaintiff's work are protected from the
defendant's copying. In this section, we consider the final issue of whether the
defendant's copying of the plaintiff's protected expression rises to the level of
improper appropriation, thus warranting a finding of copyright infringement.
The traditional test for improper appropriation is the lay observer test. This
test calls for the fact finder to compare the plaintiff's work with the defendant's
in considering the question of improper appropriation. As applied in Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer,"' where the plaintiff's novel was claimed to have been
infringed by defendant's motion picture, the court explained the test as follows:
The question... is to ascertain the effect of the allegedly infringing [work] on
the public, that is, upon the average reasonable man. If an ordinary person who
has recently read the story sits through the presentation of the picture .... he
should [be able to] detect [literary piracy] without any aid or suggestion or
of copyright infringement. The court found that the earlier version of Altai's program, that containing
copied portions of the CA object code, was infringing. With respect to the second, "clean," version,
however, the court found for Altai. CA then appealed this decision to the Second Circuit, but that
court affirmed the lower court's decision.
114. Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992).
115. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc, 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985); Novak v.
NBC, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
117. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
118. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1988).
119. See NIMME ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E][1][b] (arguing that "In the wake of Feist, [a succes-
sive filtration approach] should be considered not only for factual compilations and computer pro-
grams, but across the gamut of copyright law.").
120. This test for improper appropriation is alternatively referred to as the audience test. The audi-
ence test is traditionally stated in terms of the lay observer's reaction to the similarities in the works
under consideration. Thus, these terms have come to be used interchangeably. For purposes of this
discussion, the "lay observer" label more accurately depicts the analysis followed by most courts and
serves to better illustrate the issues under consideration.
121. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
[Vol. V:43
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critical analysis by others. The reaction of the public should be spontaneous and
immediate.1
Under this analysis, it is the lay observer's reaction that determines whether the
two works are substantially similar.
According to the approaches adopted in Arnstein and its progeny, the lay
observer test constitutes the final step of the copyright infringement analysis."
Once ownership, access and copying" 4 have been established, and it is deter-
mined what elements of the plaintiff's work are protectible, the courts then apply
the traditional lay observer test to determine whether there has been improper
appropriation of the plaintiff's protected expression.
In Arnstein,'" the court formulated the question of improper appropriation
as follows:
Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough; for there
can be "permissible copying," copying that is not illicit .... The question,
therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's work so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of the listeners, who comprised the audience for whom such
popular music is composed, that the defendant wrongfully appropriated some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff.26
The Arnstein court's reference to "permissible copying" relates primarily to the
copying of unprotected elements of a plaintiff's work. However, even in cases
where copying extends to protected elements, the copying may be of such insig-
nificant amount as to be considered de minimis, thus not amounting to improper
appropriation.'27 The important consideration here is that the Arnstein court re-
affirmed the use of the lay observer test on the issue of improper appropriation.
The Arnstein court also made it explicitly clear that analysis, dissection and
expert testimony are not permissible on the issue of improper appropriation."
Although the exclusion of such useful tools under the second prong of the
Arnstein test is consistent with the traditional lay observer test, this restriction,
which is strictly adhered to, has proven problematic in some cases, especially
those dealing with technical and complex works.
122. 1L at 18.
123. E.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
124. In the case where access is not proven, a showing of striking similarity between the two
works will allow the matter to proceed to the question of improper appropriation (on the question of
improper appropriation the lay observer test is preceded by the separation of the unprotected ideas
from the protected expression in plaintiff's work).
125. Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
126. Id. at 472.
127. See supra note 72. The consideration is not necessarily the quantity but the qualitative value
of the appropriated expression.
128. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the intrinsic test "does not depend on the type of external
criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic test").
1995]
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Consistent with Arnstein, Krofft's intrinsic test calls for the lay observer to
make the ultimate determination of whether there has been improper appropria-
tion. And like the Second Circuit in Arnstein, the Ninth Circuit disallows analy-
sis, dissection and expert testimony on this issue.'29 Although these decisions
are in agreement on the exclusion of analysis, dissection and expert testimony
under the lay observer test, other courts have rejected this limitation on the use
of such evidence in assisting the fact finder in determining whether there has
been improper appropriation.
Almost all of the cases rejecting the strict application of the lay observer test
involve complex works like computer programs. Whelan'3 is one example
where the court rejected the traditional lay observer test in a case involving
computer programs. The Whelan court explained the problem as follows:
The ordinary observer test.., is of doubtful value in cases involving computer
programs on account of the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to most
members of the public ... . Moreover, the distinction between the two parts of
the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same
person for each step: that person has been exposed to expert evidence in the
first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or "forget" that evidence in ana-
lyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex cases, we
doubt that the "forgetting" can be effective when the expert testimony is essen-
tial to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question.'
Despite the concerns noted in Whelan and other decisions, most courts have
declined to deviate from the traditional lay observer test. Some courts, even
though recognizing the problems inherent in applying the lay observer test in
cases involving complex works, have felt constrained from deviating from the
traditional ArnsteinlKrofft approach excluding analysis, dissection, and expert
testimony.'32
Other courts, recognizing the limitations of a strict audience test, have advo-
cated the use of an "intended audience" test. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Dawson v. Hinshaw, a musical copyright infringement case, is typical. 3 In
129. As for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Shaw, the court's modifications to the Kroff substantial
similarity test were largely limited to the first prong of the test. The court in Shaw did, however,
relabel the Krofft intrinsic test as the "subjective" test as it felt that that label stated more accurately
the test's "mere subjective judgment as to whether the two works are or are not similar." Shaw v.
Lindheim, 908 F.2d 535, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). But aside from the change in terminology, the Shaw
decision left unchanged the lay observer test as formulated by the court in Kroffi.
130. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
131. Id. at 1232.
132. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (citing Whelan's decision to allow the admission of expert testimony on the question of im-
proper appropriation but stating that "while this may be the wave of the future in this area, the Ninth
Circuit's position is clearly marked out by Krofft, [which] controls the analysis herein.").
133. In Dawson, the defendant was alleged to have copied plaintiff's copyrighted song. The copied
work was not, however, a recording of the song, but rather, was in the form of sheet music. Given
the nature of the works under consideration, the court felt that "an ordinary lay observer, with noth-
ing before him other than sheet music, [would be unable] to determine [whether] the two works were
substantially similar." Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. V:43
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criticizing the traditional lay observer test, the Dawson court recognized the
inadequacies of the audience test and stated that:
obedience to the undisputed principles of copyright law and the policy underly-
ing the ordinary observer test requires a recognition of the limits of the ordinary
lay observer characterization of the ordinary observer test. Those principles
require orientation of the ordinary observer test to the works' intended audience,
permitting an ordinary lay observer characterization of the test only where the
lay public fairly represents the works' intended audience."34
From the reasoning in Dawson, it should be clear that the ordinary observer test
is problematic not only in cases involving complex works like musical composi-
tions and computer programs, but in any case involving a work whose under-
standing requires specialized skill or knowledge beyond that possessed by the or-
dinary lay observer.
Part of the problem here is that the lay observer test for infringement analysis
was meant to apply to copyright law a "reasonable person" standard similar to
that used in other areas of the law.'35 But in other situations where the "reason-
able person" standard is applied, the fact finder is asked whether the defendant's
actions constitute acceptable conduct for an ordinary reasonable person placed in
the defendant's shoes. Just how this standard relates to the problem of improper
appropriation is unclear. Should the fact finder be asking whether a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would have known that the copying at issue
would amount to improper appropriation? If this is the proper question for the
fact finder to ask, by what standard does she determine what is acceptable as
compared to unacceptable copying? Surely this decision must be made by one
who is apprised of the applicable law and one who is familiar with the type of
work at issue. Unless these parameters are defined and adhered to, the risk of an
erroneous decision on the issue of improper appropriation may lead to a finding
of infringement, or lack thereof, when a contrary finding is warranted.'36
134. Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
135. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
NmtER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E][2]).
136. See Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. REs. L. REv. 395, 423 (1992)
("having an unaided, uninformed, disinterested or distanced finder of fact creates a potential risk of
error that should not be there"); David B. Lingenfelter, Notes and Comments, Differentiating Idea
And Expression In Copyrighted Computer Software: The Test For Infringement, 6 J.L. & COM. 419,
432 (1986)
The fact finder cannot validly identify the presence or absence of copying in a factual
situation by using only the ordinary observer test. The ordinary observer test may not only
mislead the finder of fact, it may also ignore the creative expression of the programmer
and further erode the idea/expression dichotomy of the copyright system. The ordinary ob-
server test may appropriately be excluded from the analysis of computer copyright dis-
putes because its imprecision introduces a significant probability of error to the finding of
fact.
See also, id. at 433 ("The fundamental threat to the copyright system in applying the ordinary ob-
server test to computer programs is the likelihood that the idea of the program will be protected by
1995]
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In recognizing these problems and the possibility that the lay observer test
may result in erroneous conclusions on the issue of improper appropriation,
numerous commentators have suggested, and several courts have adopted, ex-
ceptions and modifications to the traditional lay observer test. The intended audi-
ence test is one example. 37 The intended audience test is applied by substitut-
ing for the ordinary lay observer, a fact finder possessing the requisite skill or
knowledge necessary to fully comprehend and understand the works under con-
sideration. It is argued that this modification to the lay observer test is particu-
larly necessary in cases dealing with complex works like computer programs.3
It has also been argued that the intended audience test should be used in cases
dealing with musical works,'39 advanced literary works,"4 and other works
that are complex in nature.""
Arguably, the foundational decisions of Arnstein and Krofft support the use of
an intended audience test. In Arnstein, the court stated the question of improper
appropriation as "whether the defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff."'42 Similarly, in Krofft, the court, after for-
mulating its intrinsic test, stated that "[t]he present case demands an even more
intrinsic determination because both plaintiff's and defendant's works are direct-
ed at an audience of children [thus raising] the particular factual issue of the
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of young peo-
ple."'" From these statements, it seems clear that the use of an intended audi-
the copyright law.").
137. Another alternative is the use of expert testimony to "educate" the finder of fact as to the
specialized consideration of the works at issue. This method was applied in Altai, 982 F.2d 693 and
in Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
138. See Pamela Hobbs, Methods of Determining Substantial Similarity In Copyright Cases In-
volving Computer Programs, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 393, 406 (1990)
The ordinary observer inquiry was designed to determine general aesthetic similarities be-
tween the copyrighted work and the alleged copy ... . Computer programs, however,
have neither ordinary observers nor an easily perceived aesthetic appeal ... . Since there
are no ordinary observers of computer programs, the application of the ordinary observer
standard to judge similarities in computer programs would be an entirely fictitious process.
(citing Howard Root, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substan-
tial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264 (1984)).
139. See Grinvalsky, supra note 136, at 396
Although music requires no specialized knowledge to simply appreciate, the same is not
true in comparing two works for infringement. Music's natural appeal masks the com-
plexities involved in both its creation and its analysis. The analytical problems which arise
from the limited language of music require that determination of music copyright in-
fringement be made by the intended audience.
140. NImimrER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E][2] (recognizing that there will "be numerous instances
where the 'ordinary observer' is simply not capable of detecting very real appropriation").
141. Id.
142. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added).
143. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166
(9th Cir. 1977).
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ence test in situations where the works at issue are intended for a particular
segment of the population or a discreet group of individuals would be consistent
with both the Second Circuit's decision in Arnstein and the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Krofft. Given the possibility that the lay observer may reach an erroneous
conclusion on the question of improper appropriation, an error that could be
avoided by applying the test to the audience for whom the work was intended,
the preference for an intended audience test should be obvious.
A second restriction on the improper appropriation test is the exclusion of
expert testimony. Outside the area of computer works, the courts have consis-
tently excluded expert testimony under this prong of the copyright infringement
test. But the question that must be considered is this - if expert testimony is
helpful and permissible in determining improper appropriation in complex works
like computer programs,'" why should it be excluded in other cases where it
would assist the finder of fact? In cases involving computer programs the courts
have recognized that expert testimony as well as analysis and dissection of the
works in question is often a necessary step in the improper appropriation deci-
sion. 45 But even in cases where the works are not particularly complex in na-
ture, a lay observer may confuse similarities in unprotectible ideas with
protectible expression or may simply be misled by the similarities between the
two works where in fact the similarities do not warrant a finding of improper
appropriation.'" A particularly good example is in the case where a plaintiffs
protected expression is unlawfully appropriated but is used in a different medium
than that of the original. Theoretically the lay observer should be able to spot
this infringing use despite its appearance in a different medium. As Nimmer
points out, however, "if because of the camouflage of a different medium, the
lay audience loses sight of the [infringing] similarity, the fact remains that the
plaintiff [has] suffered a substantial appropriation of [her] protected expres-
sion.' This is especially troubling when one considers that such an erroneous
result might be easily avoided by the use of expert testimony on this issue.
Considering the admissibility of expert testimony and its helpfulness in reach-
ing a proper decision in certain cases, whether complex in nature or not, it is
suggested that use of expert testimony in considering improper appropriation
should extend beyond the realm of computer programs. In cases where the works
144. As we have seen, the reason for admission of expert testimony in cases involving complex
works like computer programs is that the issues at bar are generally beyond the general knowledge of
the typical lay person. If this is true in the case of computer programs, it should apply equally well in
cases involving other types of works that are sufficiently complex as to be beyond the general knowl-
edge of the typical lay persons.
145. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed Cir. 1992); Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
146. See Bruce Perelman, Comment, Proving Copyright Infringement Of Computer Software: An
Analytical Framework, 18 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 919, 937 (1985) (suggesting that, even in cases involv-
ing non-complex works, analysis and dissection may help avoid erroneous conclusions on the ques-
tion of improper appropriation).
147. NimmER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E][2].
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at issue involve matters beyond the scope of knowledge of the ordinary lay per-
son, the courts should use the tools available to avoid an erroneous outcome. The
admissibility of expert testimony should be considered among the options avail-
able to the courts in such cases.
III. A RESTATEMENT OF THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT TEST AND ITS
APPLICATION TO VARIOUS TYPES OF WORKS
The copyright infringement issues discussed in the preceding section have led
us down a long and winding road. To clarify and build upon some of the con-
cepts encountered along the way, I have in this section, restated the copyright
infringement test and have provided several examples of how the modified anal-
ysis might be applied to various types of works. This restatement of the copy-
right infringement test and the examples provided should help to eliminate some
of the confusion that exists under the numerous formulations presently followed
by the courts.
A. A RESTATEMENT OF THE TEST FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
As an initial matter, the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action must show
ownership of a valid copyright in the allegedly infringed work. In accordance
with section 410(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976, a registration certificate will
provide prima facia evidence of ownership." Once ownership is established,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's ownership is im-
proper or defective. 49 Following ownership, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted work. While access need not be affirma-
tively established in every instance, as is the case where two works are found to
be strikingly similar, there must be at least a bare possibility that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work.
If ownership and access are established, the two works are then compared to
determine whether the defendant's work bears similarities to the plaintiff's that
are probative of copying. On the question of probative similarity, analysis, dis-
section, and expert testimony are admissible. Moreover, this evaluation should
entail consideration of the works' protected and unprotected elements. If the
defendant's work does not contain probative similarities, there is no infringe-
ment. If probative similarities are found, then the question of improper appropri-
ation must be addressed.
On the question of improper appropriation, we first need to determine what
elements of the plaintiff's work are protectible. To accomplish this the court
applies an abstractions test' in combination with a successive filtering ap-
proach' to distill from the plaintiff's work a core of protectible expression.
148. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. See supra pp. 18-19.
151. See supra pp. 24-27.
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Once the protected expression is identified, it is compared to the defendant's
work to determine whether the two works are substantially similar, thus warrant-
ing a finding of infringement.
The final analysis on the question of improper appropriation is conducted by
the audience for whom the work was intended.'52 In making this determination,
analysis, dissection, and expert testimony are admissible at the court's discretion.
B. APPLICATION OF THE COPYRIGHT INFRNGEMENT TEST TO VARIOUS TYPES OF
WORKS
To demonstrate how this methodology can be applied in copyright infringe-
ment cases involving various types of works, the remainder of this section in-
volves our application of the author's reformulated test to the following types of
works; 1) literary works, 2) pictorial, graphic, sculptural and audiovisual works,
3) factual works, including maps, directories, case reports, chronicles and texts,
and 4) functional works such as plans, forms, rules and computer programs.
1. Literary Works
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Shaw v. Lindheim53 provides a good founda-
tion for our analysis of copyright infringement cases involving literary works. In
Shaw, the writer of a pilot script entitled "The Equalizer" sued the writer of a
television series treatment with the same title. The primary defendant, Richard
Lindheim, had entered into an option contract with Shaw on behalf of NBC
Television (NBC). The contract gave NBC the option to develop a television
series based on Shaw's pilot script. NBC declined to produce the series, howev-
er, and under the terms of Shaw's contract, all rights to the script reverted back
to Shaw.
Lindheim later left NBC to join Universal Television (Universal). While at
Universal, Lindheim wrote his own television series treatment entitled "The
Equalizer." Lindheim's treatment was later expanded into the pilot script for
"The Equalizer" television series which was produced by CBS. Shaw sued
Lindheim for copyright infringement but the lower court granted summary judg-
ment for Lindheim and the other defendants.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that genuine issues of mate-
rial fact existed with respect to Shaw's claim that the two scripts were substan-
tially similar. Working with the facts set out in Judge Alarcon's opinion, we can
apply the restated infringement test to this case to see how the new methodology
works in practice. After establishing ownership and access, we can begin by
asking whether there are similarities between the two works that are probative of
copying by the defendant.
From the details provided it seems easily established that such similarities
exist in the two literary works at issue. A few of the similarities here are the
152. See supra pp. 30-34.
153. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
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titles, which are identical, the fact that both stories revolve around a single main
character who works to protect an innocent person from a criminal black-
mail/conspiracy scheme, and that both works present the main character as well
educated and wealthy. Additionally, the other characters incident to the story
have similar traits and the dialogue contained in the defendant's work is de-
scribed as strikingly similar to the plaintiff's. Based on these similarities we can
safely say that there is evidence probative of copying by the defendant.
The next step of our inquiry, and the first step in our determination of wheth-
er the defendant's copying amounts to improper appropriation, is to identify what
elements of the plaintiff's work are protectible. We can begin by defining the
plaintiff's work as consisting of different levels of abstraction, working from the
general to the specific."4 Following the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the four levels
of abstraction are; 1) the theme, 2) the plot or sequence of events, 3) the mood,
setting and pace, and 4) the characters and dialogue.'55
The court defined the theme of both works as revolving "around the character
of The Equalizer - 'a man who will equalize the odds, a lone man working
against the system.""56 The theme itself, however, was correctly found to be an
unprotectible idea."57 But looking beyond the basic idea, the court found ele-
ments of the theme to be expressive. The court considered how the plaintiff
developed the theme - The Equalizer "solicits clients requiring assistance con-
ventional law enforcement cannot offer"' 8 and that the lead character "de-
scribes his role as to 'shake up' or 'equalize' the odds."'159
Turning to the plot, the court correctly noted that elements of the plot could
be sufficiently expressive to be deemed protectible."w The court also recog-
nized that, although none of the individual events were sufficiently expressive to
be protectible, the pattern or sequence of events was sufficiently expressive to be
considered protectible. The protectible sequence of events that make up the plot
of plaintiff's work includes: the blackmail of a candidate for public office; the
154. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit, prior to considering the levels of abstraction in the
plaintiff's work, felt it necessary to state that "the fact that the two works have identical titles also
weighs in [plaintiff's] favor." Id. at 539. Despite it's recognition of the widely accepted proposition
set out by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), that "[a] title cannot
be copyrighted," the Ninth Circuit proceeded to "acknowledge and consider defendant's admitted
copying of [plaintiff's] title in determining whether there is substantial similarity of protected expres-
sion between the two works." Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Ninth Circuit's analysis on this point is simply wrong. Given the fact that a title is not
protected expression (a proposition that the Ninth Circuit recognizes), consideration of such unpro-
tected elements of a plaintiff's work should be excluded from the court's analysis on the question of
improper appropriation. Accordingly, our analysis differs from the Ninth Circuit's in considering the
similarity in titles only on the question of probative similarity and not on the question of improper
appropriation.
155. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 540-41.
156. Id. at 540.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 541.
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criminals' attempt to kill The Equalizer's client by running her down with a
truck; the fact that at their initial meeting The Equalizer and his client are shot at
by the criminals and The Equalizer saves his client; a scene where The Equalizer
appears, uninvited, at a party wearing a tuxedo; The Equalizer's confrontation
with the political candidate after a campaign speech; The Equalizer "thwarts" the
criminal conspiracy and saves the female client; and finally, the political candi-
date is forced to withdraw from the political race.'
The third level of abstraction identified by the court is the mood, setting, and
pace. The plaintiff's story was described by the court as "fast-paced," and as
having an "ominous" and "cynical" mood. The story was set in a large city.
These elements were correctly found to be common to this type of work and
were therefore considered unprotectible.
The fourth and final level of abstraction considered is that of the characters
and dialogue. Here, the court notes the characteristics of the main character,
including the fact that he is well dressed, wealthy and has expensive tastes. Also
noted are his "self-assuredness" and "unshakable faith in the satisfactory out-
come of any difficult situation."'
62
Having determined what elements of the plaintiff's work are protectible as an
initial matter, we can proceed to the filtration step and "filter" out such
unprotectible elements as stock settings, stock literary figures, plot devices, and
scenes a faire.63 We can also consider filtering out elements that the court
found to protectible, beginning with what the court considered the "expressive"
elements of the theme. Such elements include the main character's solicitation of
clients "requiring assistance that conventional law enforcement cannot offer" and
his goal of shaking up, or equalizing the odds. While not necessarily incident to
the theme of the work, these elements of an action story have become so com-
mon that they should not be considered protectible. Given the court's description,
the use of such common elements in television shows and other works belies the
possibility that these characteristics can be found sufficiently unique to the
plaintiff's work to be considered protectible. These thematic elements of the
plaintiff's work should be filtered out as unprotectible.
The personal traits of the main character that the court found to be protectible
should also be filtered out. These characteristics, said to include, personal wealth,
expensive tastes, "self-assuredness" and "unshakable faith in the satisfactory
outcome of any difficult situation,"'" are simply too common to the genre to
be deemed protectible.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT - PINCIPLEs, LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2.7 (1989 & Supp.
1992).
As for scenes a faire, these are often described as consisting of "incidents, characters or settings
which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic."
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). For example, the use of a beach landing scene
in a movie depicting the Battle of Normandy would be practically indispensable.
164. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 541.
1995]
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Thus, after the filtration step, we are left with the plot or sequence of events
as the sole protectible elements of the plaintiff's work. The question now is
whether the similarities in the defendant's work are sufficient to warrant a find-
ing of improper appropriation. On the question of improper appropriation, we can
use the traditional lay observer test as this work is intended for the general pub-
lic, not a limited segment of the population with specialized knowledge or exper-
tise. Given the fact that the sequence of events identified as protectible are iden-
tical in the two works, a finding of improper appropriation and thus infringement
is possible, and the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant
appears to have been improper. 65
2. Pictorial, Graphic, Sculptural and Audiovisual Works
As an example of how the restated copyright infringement test might be ap-
plied in a case involving works of visual arts, we can look to the facts of
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc."6 In that case, artist Saul Steinberg
sued Columbia Pictures for copyright infringement of an illustration Steinberg
had created for the cover of "The New Yorker" magazine. Steinberg's illustra-
tion, described as "a parochial New Yorker's view of the world,"'67 was also
being sold in poster form. Columbia had created a similar poster to use in an
advertisement for its movie "Moscow on the Hudson."
As in the previous example, neither the plaintiff's ownership nor the
defendant's access to the plaintiff's work was disputed in Steinberg. The primary
focus was whether the defendant copied from plaintiff's work and whether such
copying amounts to improper appropriation. On the question of copying we first
look for similarities that are probative of copying by the defendant. Here, such
similarities include the rapidly diminishing perspective, the layout of the streets,
river, and buildings, the style used to depict buildings and other structures, the
colors used for the background, and the "spiky block print" used by the art-
165. The district court's analysis in Shaw, however, is worth noting. After establishing ownership
and finding similarities in the works' ideas under the extrinsic test, the court then undertook an
idea/expression analysis equivalent to a filtration approach before asking whether a triable issue of
fact remained. Having found that "plaintiffs... failed to establish that enough protected expression
[was copied]," the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement. In this sense, the
court's analysis is similar to the restated approach set out supra section I(A). Despite the fact that
the court reached a decision contrary to the one reached here, its attempted adoption of a more mean-
ingful analysis than that set out in Krofft is admirable. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit was not as
appreciative of what the district court was attempting to accomplish. The Ninth Circuit's opinion
reasserted the validity of Krofft and held that "it is improper to find, as the district court did, that
there is no substantial similarity as a matter of law after a [plaintiff] has satisfied the extrinsic test"
See id. at 537. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's opinion, once copying has been established as an
initial matter, the trier of fact then considers the works as a whole for similarities of expression. And,
consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, there is no filtration step nor is the lay observer's consid-
eration limited to only the protected elements of the works.
166. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
167. Id. at 709.
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ist.'" Keeping in mind that similarities probative of copying may be found in
both protected and unprotected elements of the defendant's work,"° it is obvi-
ous that such similarities are prevalent in this case.
Having found similarities probative of copying, we can address the question
of improper appropriation beginning with an abstractions test to break the
plaintiff's work into its constituent elements. From these separate elements we
can then determine which parts of plaintiff's work are protectible.
The first level of abstraction, the work's underlying idea, is defined by the
court as "a map of the world from an egocentrically myopic perspective."'
' 7
This is properly recognized as unprotectible. Next, the court considered the
plaintiff's style which it described as "sketchy" and "whimsical." The court
seems to have felt this style to be unique to the plaintiff, and thus protectible.
This is evidenced by the court's statement that the "[d]efendant's illustration was
executed in [a] ... style that has become one of Steinberg's hallmarks," and
that "since style is one ingredient of 'expression,' this ... is significant."
17
'
The next level of abstraction considered is the artists' perspective. This is
described as "a bird's eye view across the edge of Manhattan and a river bor-
dering New York City to the world beyond."'" On this point, the court found
the "vantage point [looking] directly down a wide two-way cross street that inter-
sects two avenues before reaching a river" to be protectible expression. To bol-
ster its view that the perspective is protectible, the court states that "this is not an
inevitable way of depicting blocks in a city with a grid like street system, partic-
ularly since most New York City cross streets are one-way."'
73
Protectible elements of the plaintiffs work are also found in the last level of
abstraction, the details of the work. Here, the court notes similarities in such
protectible elements as Steinberg's depiction of the water towers, the cars, a red
sign above a parking lot, and many individual buildings. The "shapes, windows,
and configurations of various edifices," as well as "the ornaments, facades, and
details of Steinberg's buildings" are deemed to be protected expression. An-
other element that the court found to be protectible detail is the "spiky block
print" used by Steinberg.73
Accepting the court's conclusions as to the protectability of these elements,
we can proceed to the filtration step to eliminate any additional elements which
remain but should not be protected. Beginning with the court's willingness to
protect the style of the plaintiff's work, it should be questioned whether the style
itself should be protected. While it may be true that this style has become
Steinberg's "hallmark," this does not mean that it is protected expression.'76 In
168. Id. at 713.
169. See supra pp. 13-17.
170. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 713.
175. Id.
176. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT - PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTIcE, § 2.11 (1989 &
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fact, the style itself is not protectible, it is the application of that style to indi-
vidual elements that creates protectible expression."7 The protected expression
exists in the individual elements of the work, not in the overall style, which is in
the public domain.
The next area for consideration is the plaintiff's perspective. The plaintiff's
work is described as depicting "approximately four city blocks in detail and
becomes increasingly minimalist as the design recedes into the background."'78
But like Steinberg's "style," his perspective is not itself protected expression.
The use of certain devices to depict the perspective may render certain elements
of the work protectible. The distinctions noted by the court, however, are simply
too general in nature to render them protectible expression. An aerial view down
a city street can hardly be said to be unique to a given artist. Such a perspective
is a common vantage point for artists, photographers and others. Surely it would
be improper to allow one individual to preclude others from using this perspec-
tive in their works. If there are any protectible elements to the artist's perspec-
tive, these may be shown in the individual elements of the work, but not in such
general aspects as the grid-like street pattern, the diminishing perspective or the
increasingly minimalist design of the background.
The similarity in the buildings, however, is significant as none of the build-
ings actually exist, they are all of Steinberg's creation. Thus, the defendant could
not argue that the buildings in his work are simply accurate depictions of the
same buildings Steinberg included in his work as the buildings do not exist in
reality. These elements should be considered protected expression and are thus
not filtered out.
The last elements noted as protected expression, one that should be filtered
out, is the lettering which was considered unique to Steinberg. The court is sim-
ply wrong is suggesting that the similarity of the lettering is admissible on the
question of improper appropriation. Typefaces, fonts and letter styles are not
protectible expression. While the court could properly consider this similarity on
the question of probative similarity, 179 it should not be admissible on the
question of improper appropriation because it is not protected expression.
Having identified the protectible elements of the plaintiff's work as consisting
of individual details, such as buildings, signs, and water towers, we can apply the
lay observer test to determine if the similarities constitute improper appropri-
ation. In this case, the traditional lay observer test is appropriate as the intended
audience for these works is the general public. But while the lay observer test is
appropriate here, there is also a strong argument to be made for allowing analy-
sis and dissection, or perhaps expert testimony, at this point in the inquiry. If the
lay observer in this case were to consider the works side by side without the aid
of such evidence, she might ignore the fact that many of the similarities between
Supp. 1992).
177. Id.
178. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
179. See supra pp. 13-17.
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the two works derive from the unprotected elements of the works. Indeed a side
by side comparison might lead to a judgment based on the overall "look and
feel" of the two works. This could result in an unwarranted finding of infringe-
ment. The proper procedure here would be to instruct the lay observer as to the
specific elements of the plaintiff's work that are found to be protected and in-
struct her to consider only those elements in her improper appropriation analysis.
The court in Steinberg concluded that the defendant had infringed Steinberg's
copyrighted work. But given the fact that many of the elements of Steinberg's
work considered to be protected expression were found to be unprotectible under
the filtration step of our analysis, the court may have reached the wrong conclu-
sion. Adding to the possibility that the result is an erroneous one is the exclusion
of analysis, dissection, and expert testimony on the question of improper appro-
priation. While the two works appear very similar, perhaps even strikingly simi-
lar, at first glance, many of the similarities are in the unprotected elements of the
works. The proportion of the defendant's work that is similar to the protected
elements of the plaintiff's work is significantly less than that suggested by the
court, and may or may not be sufficient to support a finding of infringement.
3. Factual Works - Maps, Directories, Case Reports, Chronicles and Texts
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc."W did not provide an extended analysis of the test for copy-
right infringement, the factual setting of Feist provides an interesting basis for
the application of the restated infringement analysis to factual works like directo-
ries. Since the Court in Feist settled the question of copyrightability of the white
pages, an interesting proposition is whether a similar result would be reached if
the defendant in Feist had copied Feist's yellow pages.
Assuming that ownership and access are established and that the defendant
admits to copying from plaintiff's work,"' we can focus on the question of
improper appropriation. To this end, we start by applying an abstractions test to
break the work down into its constituent parts, then we can apply a filtration ap-
proach to dissect the core of protected expression, if any, before considering the
question of improper appropriation.
The yellow pages might be defined most generally as a directory for consum-
er services.'" Certainly such a concept is not protectible. Perhaps next we can
consider the directory's alphabetized listings. These too would be held
180. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
181. In Feist, the defendants admitted copying, thus the only issue for the Court was the question
of improper appropriation. In its effort to separate the ideas from plaintiff's protected expression, the
Court determined that the plaintiff's claimed expression lacked the modicum of creativity necessary
to establish copyright protection. Finding that the elements claimed to be protected were not, due to a
lack of originality, the Court rendered judgment for the defendant without reaching the lay observer
test.
182. Alternatively, a yellow pages directory could be intended as a directory for business related
services, a directory of toll free numbers, or a myriad of other variations. In this hypothetical exam-
ple, a consumer directory is used as it is probably the most common and familiar variety.
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unprotectible, as in the Supreme Court's decision."3 Next, we can consider the
subject headings or listings in the directory. At this point, there may be sufficient
creativity to warrant some limited protection. The plaintiffs classification of
goods under certain headings might be sufficiently arbitrary to be deemed
protectible expression. Headings such as "Automobile Dealers-New Cars" would
not be protectible but others like "Digital Instrumentation Systems & Equipment"
might be. And while individual headings may or may not be protectible, the
overall organization, that is, the framework or complete listing of headings
should be considered protectible as there is likely to be more than a modicum of
creativity present in the overall organization of the work.'84 A final level of ab-
straction" might be the individual advertisements contained in the yellow pag-
es. These are likely to be sufficiently creative to warrant protection. Many of the
advertisements contain original artwork and are individual to the companies
placing the advertisements. These expressive elements should be protected from
unauthorized copying.
Proceeding on the assumption that some individual headings and advertise-
ments are found to be protected expression, we can then filter out any additional
elements that should not be protected including, for example, material in the
public domain, and scenes a faire.'86 Examples of such unprotectible elements
might include a depiction of a set of scales in an advertisement for an attorney
or a picture of a man or woman with a stethoscope around his or her neck in an
advertisement for a physician. These elements would be filtered out as
unprotectible. Finally, after having identified plaintiff's protected expression, the
issue of improper appropriation could be addressed under the audience test.
In this example, the intended audience is the general public, thus the average
lay observer should be capable of determining, without the aid of analysis, dis-
section or expert testimony, whether the defendant's copying amounts to improp-
er appropriation. Providing that the defendant copies a qualitatively sufficient
amount of plaintiff's protected expression,8 7 the result should be a finding of
copyright infringement.
183. Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 356 ("This time honored tradition does not possess the
minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.").
184. Feist recognizes that a compilation is protectible, although the protection is said to be "thin."
Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. As the selection and organization of the headings contained in a yellow pages
directory is likely to be more arbitrary and require a greater degree of creativity than the white pages,
it should follow that there is at least a thin layer of protection for the work as a compilation. This
view was espoused by the Second Circuit in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing
Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) which found the selection, coordination and arrangement of
listings in plaintiff's yellow pages directory for Chinese-American businesses to be sufficiently origi-
nal to warrant copyright protection as a compilation.
185. It should be noted that the levels of abstraction used in this hypothetical are arbitrary and may
vary from case to case and in application to different types of works. There are no set levels of ab-
straction for a particular type of work. Rather, it is up to the courts to define the levels of abstraction
that will best assist in analyzing the elements of the work being considered.
186. See supra note 163 discussing "scenes a faire".
187. See supra note 72.
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4. Functional Works - Plans, Forms, Rules and Computer Programs
The final type of works to be considered are functional works. This class
includes computer programs which are the subject of a growing number of in-
fringement actions. In our initial discussion of the filtration approach for sep-
arating ideas from expression, we considered the Second Circuit's opinion in
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.'88 The Altai court's infringement
analysis parallels the approach set out in the beginning of this section. Thus to
demonstrate how the restated infringement test might be applied to functional
works, we can consider its application in the context of computer programs by
re-evaluating the Altai decision. The Second Circuit's opinion in Altai focused
on the question of improper appropriation. The plaintiff's ownership was not a
contested issue,189 nor was the defendant's access to plaintiff's work, which
was assumed by the lower court."9 The existence of probative similarities was
also not discussed by the appellate court as it was accepted that such similarities
were present.' Thus, the focus of the appellate court's opinion centers on the
question of improper appropriation.
To analyze the issue of improper appropriation, the Altai court first applied an
abstractions test which it followed with a successive filtration approach. Then,
after establishing what elements of the plaintiff's work were protected, the court
compared the two works on the question of improper appropriation."n
In defining the plaintiff's computer program by level of abstraction, the dis-
trict court in Altai identified five levels ranging from the most specific to most
general. The levels of abstraction noted by the court were; 1) object code, 2)
source code, 3) parameter lists, 4) services required, and 5) general outline. 9 '
The appellate court accepted this abstraction analysis and proceeded to the fil-
tration process.
At this point, the court filtered out elements dictated by efficiency con-
cerns, 194 and those dictated by external factors 95 such as mechanical specifi-
188. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
189. Id. at 699.
190. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 775 F. Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
191. The defendant acknowledged that such similarities existed but claimed that the similarities
resulted from independent creation, not illicit copying. See supra note 113 discussing the factual
background of Altai.
192. This discussion focuses only on the court's decision with respect to the second, "clean," ver-
sion of Altai's program, which was the subject of the plaintiffs appeal to the Second Circuit. See
supra note 113. In it's decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision as to the non-
infringing nature of Altai's "clean" program. In doing so, the appellate court adopted the lower
court's analysis on the question of improper appropriation, albeit with several minor modifications.
193. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
194. See Computer Assocs. nt'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) ("While,
hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a [computer] programmer may effectuate
certain functions within a program, - i.e., express the idea embodied in a given routine - efficiency
concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to make only one or two forms of expres-
sion workable options.").
195. See id. at 709 ("in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform 35
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cations, compatibility requirements, design standards, industry demands, and
widely accepted industry practices. The court also filtered out any elements
found to be in the public domain.'
Once the court had "sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program
which [were considered] 'ideas' or [were] dictated by efficiency or external
factors or taken from the public domain,"'97 the court was left with a core of
protected expression. The court then proceeded to consider the question of im-
proper appropriation. On this issue, the court rejected the lay observer test in
favor of an intended audience test. The court "recognize[d] the reality that com-
puter programs are likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay observers - and
thus, seem to fall outside the category of works contemplated by those who
engineered the [lay observer] test."'98
From this reasoning, the court decided that "with respect to computer pro-
grams .... the trier of fact need not be limited by the strictures of its own lay
perspective ... . Rather, we leave it to the discretion of the... court to decide
to what extent, if any, expert opinion... is warranted in a given case."'' The
court thus affirmed the district court's use of expert testimony on the question of
improper appropriation.2" The court then proceeded to compare the protected
elements of the plaintiff's work with the defendant's work and affirmed the
district court's ruling that the similarities in the two works were not sufficient to
warrant a finding of improper appropriation and thus there was no infringe-
ment.20
The Altai decision demonstrates how the restated infringement analysis, in-
cluding the successive filtration method, and a modified audience test, can be
used in cases involving functional works like computer programs. This analysis
should prove helpful as infringement actions involving computer programs are
becoming increasingly common and represent some of the more difficult and
challenging issues in the area of copyright infringement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much of the confusion that exists in the area of copyright infringement law
results from the courts' use of inaccurate and inconsistent terminology in its
opinions in copyright infringement cases. Moreover, the myriad of approaches
adopted by the various circuits and the variations within those circuits has led to
a great deal of confusion, inconsistency, and unpredictability in this area of the
law.
To avoid these problems it has been suggested that the courts follow a restate-
particular functions in a specific computing environment without employing standard techniques").
196. See id. at 710.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 713.
199. Id.
200. But the court specifically limited its opinion on the use of expert testimony on the question of
improper appropriation to cases involving computer programs. See id.
201. Id. at 721.
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ment of the traditional copyright infringement analysis which requires that the
plaintiff prove copyright ownership and the defendant's access to the allegedly
infringed work. Once these are shown, the court focuses on whether the
defendant's work contains similarities that are probative of copying. If these
probative similarities are not found, the analysis is at an end. If they are present,
then the finder of fact must consider whether the defendant's copying amounts to
improper appropriation. Here, the court applies an abstraction test followed by a
successive filtering approach to extract the protected elements from the plaintiff's
work. The matter is then left to the fact finder to determine whether the simi-
larities amount to improper appropriation.
This restatement of the copyright infringement analysis should help eliminate
the confusion which has resulted from past articulations of the copyright in-
fringement test by the various courts. An additional benefit from this formulation
of the infringement analysis is its flexibility which allows application to various
types of works without the exceptions and intricacies necessary under the current
approaches. What is needed in this area of the law is a clear, easily applied,
method for adjudicating copyright infringement claims with consistency and
predictability. Hopefully, this restatement of the infringement analysis will take
us in that direction.
1995]
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